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Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of sustainability (ESG) on US listed firms’ exit decision. Using a 
recent dataset of a large number of US firms over the period 2007- 2016, we perform a dynamic 
empirical analysis of the relation between ESG and firms’ exiting mechanism by measuring 
environmental, social and governance issues. We provide evidence that corporate sustainability is 
a tool that can reduce risks and enable companies to boost surviving mechanisms and face less 
probability of failure. Finally, we perform several statistical tests for robustness purposes. 
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1. Introduction  
In recent decades, the number of firms listed on US exchanges has been substantially decreased 
compared with the last 20 years.  In 1996, there were 8.000 listed firms in the US markets while 
in 2016 only 3,627 firms. In addition, according to FRED1, the number of listed firms per million 
for United States has been decreased from 27 to 13 during the period 1998 - 2016.  These numbers 
highlight two things; first, the importance of this phenomenon and second, the growing need for 
studying the factors that may contribute to its reduction.  
 
The extant empirical literature documents that there is a growing number of firms exiting US 
market either by failing or being acquired (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001; Ritter, 2003; 
Ciccotello, 2014; Grullon et. al., 2015). This transition of companies from public to private 
ownership happens for many reasons such as higher investment in R&D, changes in ownership 
structure, new regulations and increased competition (Jain and Kini, 2000; Jain and Kini, 2008). 
Prior literature highlights the importance of firm level specific characteristics such as size, market 
share (Geroski, 1995) and drift in profitability and growth (Fama and French, 2013).  However, 
little has been known about ESG determinants on firms’ market longevity. 
 
Firms delist due to their inability to follow the requirements set by the markets; by choice to go 
private, mainly in order to shield their strategies by public disclosing information or because they 
are acquired. Technological changes are an important factor that could lead to increase market 
concentration and firm size; reduce competition for big corporations enabling them to wield market 
power (Gao et al., 2013). However, because of the decreased number of listed firms, in order to 
mitigate the phenomenon, new laws are in force. Firms have to adapt more than ever and integrate 
new technologies and strategies that will help them to control risk factors and opportunity sets. 
This has attracted the attentions of many researchers (Ciccotello, 2014; Rosett and Smith, 2014a, 
b; Grullon et al., 2015).  
 
This paper provides several contributions to the literature. First of all, it contributes to the 
financial literature and shows that ESG has influence on corporate decisions and outcomes, hence 
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plays an important role on firms’ survival mechanism. The existing literature examines mainly the 
relation between ESG firms’ financial performance (Margolis et al., 2009; Clark and Viehs, 2014) 
and firm value (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Cho et al., 2010; Porter and Kramer, 
2011; Malik, 2014; Fatemi et al., 2015). Those studies link ESG with better prospects in terms of 
value and performance. However, there are no empirical studies of the impact of ESG on firms’ 
survivability. We find that firms’ ESG issues can increase risks and this boosts companies exiting 
decisions. We provide evidence, that public trade firms with higher corporate sustainability (ESG) 
is more likely to stay listed and for longer periods of time. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first attempt in the literature that links direct firms’ ESG issues with their survival mechanisms 
and characteristics.  
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 refers to the existing theory and 
presents a testable hypothesis for our empirical part. Section 3 discusses the sample selection and 
reports the descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the analytical framework and discusses the 
main results. Section 5 presents the robustness analysis with several tests. Section 6 summarizes 
and provides conclusions remarks. 
 
2. Theory and hypothesis Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
Some scholars examine the link between sustainability and corporate value (Heal, 2004, 2008; 
Landier and Nair, 2009; Carroll et al., 2012). The firms' portfolio with strong social (Edmans, 
2011) and environmental responsibility (Derwall et al., 2005) generate risk-adjusted excess 
returns. According to Kempf and Osthoff (2007) and Statman and Glushkov (2009), portfolios that 
consist of firms with high sustainability policies perform better than those with low sustainability 
policies. Eccles et al. (2014) argue that there is a positive link between corporate sustainability and 
financial performance. Thus, firms with high sustainability are more long-term oriented and 
provide ESG reports as a transparency and accountability business strategy. Margolis and Walsh 
(2003) and Galbreath (2013) state that firms with ESG strategy are more likely to achieve capital 
at a lower cost as they build stronger reputation. Consumers, recognize the contribution to the 
society and support firms with strong environmental and social reputation (Godfrey, 2005). 
However, there are some opposite research that evidence that portfolios that consist of SRI funds 
underperform (Renneboog et al., 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009), while Hamilton et al. 
(1993), Bauer et al. (2005) and Schroder (2007) conclude that there is no positive or negative 
impact.  
Prior literature (Dowell et al., 2000; Derwall et al., 2005; Edmans, 2011; Servaes and Tamayo, 
2013) documents that a firm can enhance shareholder wealth as it creates positive impact on the 
stakeholders. Firms that meet the needs of stakeholders create value for shareholders (Freeman 
2010). Positive sustainability performance attract the attention of shareholders, as there is an 
impact on environmental issues (Konar and Cohen, 2001; Chava, 2011), social issues (Jarrell and 
Peltzman, 1985; Borenstein and Zimmerman 1988; Mitchell 1989; King and Soule 2007; Farber 
and Hallock 2009) and governance issues (Karpoff and Lott 1993; Chaney and Philipich 2002) on 
firms’ market value, credit risk and cost of capital. Firms with ESG negative events experience a 
lower market value (Capelle-Blancard and Petit, 2017). Aouadi and Marsat (2016) believe that 
ESG controversies affect firms’ market value, as they pose reputational risks. As a result, firms 
lose market share (Kang and Kim, 2013) and credibility (Yoon et al., 2006; Godfrey et al., 2009). 
Rennings et al. (2007) conclude that firms’ reputational risks affect shareholder wealth. Thus, 
firms try to make amends with their stakeholders after negative external events. Controversary 
firms generate a more positive stock market reaction when they create positive events than those 
firms who have better sustainable performance (Kotchen and Moon, 2012). Therefore, ESG creates 
positive impact to stakeholders and add value to firms (Freeman 1984; Donaldson and Preston 
1995; Godfrey et al., 2009; Kacperczyk, 2009).  
ESG reports present financial and non-financial information as a way to add value to firms and its 
shareholders and stakeholders (Eccles and Krzus, 2010). As a result, ESG reports that offer 
qualitative and quantitative information are firms’ superior tool (Eccles and Serafeim, 2014; 
Higgins et al., 2014) to influence the stakeholders. Stakeholders (consumers, employees and 
investors) prefer transparent firms, as they disclose information. As a consequence, firms that 
integrate sustainability into their business strategies establish a strong brand name, reputation and 
credibility (Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Hammond and Slocum, 1996; Brown and Dacin 1997) that 
creates positive economic value (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) and enhances the stakeholders’ 
commitments (Godfrey 2005; Wang et al., 2008). Firms' sustainable performance can also enhance 
its reputation as employer and attract the most qualified personnel (Turban and Greening, 1996; 
Greening and Turban, 2000) creating a positive outcome on corporate financial performance 
(Edmans, 2011). As a result, firms with positive employee relations have access on lower costs of 
debt financing and higher credit ratings (Bauer et al., 2009).  
Sustainability can be used as risk mitigation tool (Kim et al., 2014) as decreases systematic risk 
and increases firm value (Albuquerque et al., 2019). In particular, increases growth opportunities 
and minimize risk exposure. Thus, the higher the aggregated ESG performance is, the lower is the 
financial risk (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). Sharpe (1964) state that firms’ total risk reflects its 
stock volatility, as it is categorized into idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk (Luo and 
Bhattacharya, 2009; Jo and Na, 2012). McWilliams and Siegel (2001) and Oikonomou et al. 
(2012) state that sustainability enhances firm value on the basis of a risk-return balance (Derwall 
2007) by lowering costs and idiosyncratic risks and that ESG concerns are affiliated with higher 
systematic risk. Also, higher ESG performance can reduce the negative outcomes of firms’ 
scandals (Vanhamme and Grobben, 2009). 
Furthermore, ESG is used as a deterrent tool for costly fines as high sustainability in business 
strategy entails lower possibilities of law suits and legal fines (McGuire et al.,1988).  Bhat (1998) 
argue that fines can have a strong impact on firms’ performance and profits. So, firms adopt 
sustainable business strategies to avoid fines and overcome regulations. In this way, firms create 
value to their stakeholders and create a sustainable society. Francis and Armstrong (2003) suggest 
that a good ethical image, through sustainable business strategies, can boost firms’ reputation and 
help them to overcome regulations and reduce the possibility to be penalized. As a result, 
companies will have higher returns and access to capital and to other resources needed (Rindova 
and Fombrun, 1999; Cheng et al., 2014), as the consumers preferred them instead of those who 
have not a responsible awareness. Firms that don’t integrate ESG issues, experience bad 
performance as they don't have access to private equity and have a high cost of capital (Crifo and 
Forget, 2013). 
Deng et al. (2013) conclude that corporate sustainable performance creates value for shareholders 
due acquisitions. Flammer (2015) reports that sustainability enhances shareholder value. Firms use 
sustainability to create strategies with superior characteristics that generate competitive advantage 
and increase shareholders value (Dimson et al., 2015). Also, it improves financial returns to 
shareholders (Alexander and Buchholz, 1978; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; McWilliams et al., 
2006; Porter and Kramer, 2006), resulting in higher market values. Investors react strongly to 
sustainability reports that contains economic and legal information, while react negatively to social 
and environmental information. Kruger (2015) believe that the stock prices decrease when an 
information is revealed and create negative impact to stakeholders as firms are not responsible. 
Capelle-Blancard and Petit (2017) state that ESG reports mitigate the risk of lower market value, 
when information is disclosed by the media and not by the firm. However, the loss is higher and 
have an impact on stock prices when they contain quantitative data from an economic or legal 
information.  
Mervelskemper and Streit (2016) conclude that the stock market values a firm’s ESG performance. 
Aouadi and Marsat (2016) believe that firms with ESG strategy will survive long term, as they 
perceived less risky. Waddock and Graves (1997) believe that the ESG strategy can be regarded 
as management quality, as it can face the long-term external factors, creating competitive 
advantage. So, firms' sustainability performance offers lower financial and stock market risks and 
consequently higher probability of longevity (Oikonomou et al., 2012). Thus, firms integrate 
sustainability in their business strategies in order to gain competitive advantage, to claim more 
market share, to reduce asymmetry information and to mitigate risks (Du et al., 2011). Firms that 
disclose ESG information through transparency and accountable practices are more prone to have 
longevity (Chabowski et al., 2011). 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
From all the above information, we end up that in terms of risk, is more important how companies 
make money rather than just how much they make. Investment in ESG provides a range of positive 
protentional impacts, reduce risk factors and help firms to overcome regulations and therefore 
comply with the rules before they are enforced. We expect that through ESG performance, firms 
reduce information asymmetry, capitalize valuation benefits and secure market position and 
consumer loyalty. In addition, the literature documents that ESG has strongly positive effect on 
the value of the firm. We hypothesize that ESG is a tool for companies to control reputational 
risks, increase competitiveness, reduce uncertainty and formulate strategies about non-financial 
factors (such as environmental, social and governance) but with increasingly impact in financial 
that enables them to survive for longer periods of time in the market. From all the above we end 
up that firms with ESG exposure to reputation risks are more vulnerable, incorporate higher risk 
and face higher probability of delisting.  
3. Sample and Data  
3.1. Sample Construction  
For our empirical analysis we construct our sample based on annual data for US publicly listed 
firms covered by Crisp and Compustat. We retrieve financial data and stock prices from Compustat 
and CRSP respectively. We gather sustainability information from Rep Risk database. The former 
data start from 2007 and so as and our sample. Our final dataset consists of 1,585 US public listed 
companies covering the period 2007- 2016. 
3.2. Data Description  
The variable of our interest is firm’s sustainability ESG issues based on Rep Risk Index RRI, 
where RRI is a risk metric that quantifies a company's exposure to environmental, social and 
governance matters. The RRI score is calculated based on several factors, including the credibility 
of the source of information, the frequency and timing of criticisms, and the novelty and severity 
of the criticism and express company’s exposure to reputational risks related to ESG. The Rep 
Risk RRI score ranges from zero to hundred with higher value of the score correspond to greater 
risk exposure. We consider ESG issues as a dummy variable that takes value one when RRI score 
is greater than zero. We retrieve information for the firm' s sales (Sales), advertising (Advertising) 
and return on equity (Return on Equity) in millions of dollars from the Compustat database. In 
order to control for firm’s innovation and market establishment, we use the natural logarithm of 
firm’s patents (log (Patents +1)) and trademarks (log (TM +1)). Data for both former measures as 
well as for firm age (Log (Firm Age)) come from Orbis Intellectual Property, a global company 
database, produced by the Bureau Van Dijk (2005). Information about firms listing time to the 
market as well as delisting codes come from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database and for merger and acquisition announcement days from Securities Data Corporation's 
(SDC) database. We retrieve delisting codes from CRSP to indicate the status of issuing firm. Issue 
codes equal 100 indicate that firms at the end of our sample are still trading while those with 
delisting codes from 200 to 299 acquired in mergers and above 300 are delisted for negative 
reasons (Alhadab et al., 2014, Espenlaub et al., 2012). Last but not least, to control for financial 
crisis (Crisis), we use a dummy which takes the value of 1 for the US crisis time period of the year 
2008 and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 1 below provides summary statistics of our variables over the sample period, 2007-2016 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of firms 2007-2016 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ESG Issues 11,337 .448 .497 0 1 
RRI 11,337 7.40 10.83 0 71.50 
Log (Sales) 11,337 7.35 1.88 .005 13.08 
(Log (Sales))2 11,337 57.69 26.87 .000 171.31 
Log (Sales growth) 11,337 .251 4.96 -.998 474.81 
Log (Advertising) 11,337 1.61 2.19 0 9.182 
Log (FirmAge) 11,337 3.29 .774 0 5.043 
Log (Patents+1) 11,337 1.01 1.73 1.01 9.10 
Log (TM+1) 11,337 .228 0.541 0 4.574 
Return on Equity 11,337 .037 1.61 -58.54 99.50 
Panel B: Failed survived statistics 
 From 2007 to November 2016 failed total From 2007 to November 2016 failed due negative 
reasons 
 N % N % 
Failed  540 34% 113 7.1% 
Survived 1,045 66% 1,472 92.9% 
Total  1,585 100.00 1,585 100% 
 
Notes: Panel A, reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,585 US public listed companies. It documents the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum statistics for the sample as well as the total number of observations.The panels B, presents the 
distribution of the overall sample for both groups of firms, survived and failed. Survived firms are those that are still trading (CRSP 
delisting code of 100). Failed firms are those that are delisted due to acquisitions (delisting code from 200 to 299) and for negative 
reasons (delisting code greater than or equal 300). N denotes the number of observations. 
 
Firms’ Rep Risk Index RRI in our sample is on average quite low and about 7.40 (out of 100) and 
on average firms Log (Sales growth) is .25%. In addition, the average log of age is 3.29. Firms 
have on average 7.35% of log(sales) and their share of log(patents+1) is 1.01%, while their log 
(TM+1) share is .228. Last but not least, the share of return on equity and advertisement  is 037% 
and 1.61%respectively. Panel B reports the number and shares of delisting firms in our sample. 
Survived firms on average are 66% while the delisting firms due to acquisitions (delisting code 
from 200 to 299) and for negative reasons (delisting code greater than or equal 300) RE 34%. If 
we exclude delisting due successful merging then on the average, we have 92.9% surviving firms 
and 7.1% those who failed due negative reasons. 
 
3.3. Graphical Representation of State average ESG issues and delisting activity for US firms 
Figure 1 below provides a visualization of spatial distribution of ESG RRI issue index across states 
in the US and over the period 2007 - 2016. As we have the location of the firms and their 
sustainability performance, we were able to provide a spatial presentation of the firms in our 
sample. In addition, figure 2 presents firms market exiting distribution over the states, whereas 
highest number of delisting firms are presented with deep red and with light red orange and yellow 
are the ones that on average have lower concentration of sustainable firms. Comparing these 
figures, we see that states with on average higher ESG issues appear to have more intense delisting 
activity.  
 
 
Figure 1: State average ESG issues for US firms over the period 2007 and 2016. 
Figure 2: State average delisting activity for US firms over the period 2007 and 2016. 
4. Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US listed firms ESG on Survival  
4.1. Survival Analysis Methodology  
Survival analysis is a branch of statistics for analyzing and determine the expected length of time 
until an event happens. There is an extensive literature that examines firms’ market survivability 
by using this statistical tool (e.g. Hensler et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 2000; Fama and French, 2004; 
Jain and Martin, 2005; Carpentier and Suret, 2011; Espenlaub et al., 2012; Gerakos et al., 2013; 
Alhadab et al., 2015). One reason for this, is its advantage over regression methods (such as Probit 
and Logit models) to account for both event occurrence and time to event. Moreover, this kind of 
technics works well with censored data and events with different time horizons (LeClere, 2000; 
Shumway, 2001). In our analysis, in order to study the association between ESG performance and 
firms’ market survival, we apply nonparametric and semiparametric and parametric approaches. 
By using nonparametric estimates of hazard and survival functions, we compare the failure risks 
and survival rates between firms with ESG issues and those without, in order to determine if ESG 
has an impact in firms’ survival mechanism. The hazard function expresses a conditional 
probability of failure taking into account the time that the firm exists in the market. We use Nelson- 
Aalen estimator to compute the hazard functions for the two groups. ?̂?(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖≤𝑡                                              (1) 
We define di as the number of failed firms at time ti, and ni as the number of firms with possible 
risk at time ti and we compute with survival function the probability of firms’ survival at a 
particular time. We expect the survival function curve for firms with high ESG performance to be 
above of those with low.  We use Kaplan-Meier methodology to estimate the survival functions. 
 ?̂?(𝑡) = ∏ 𝑛𝑖−𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖≤𝑡                                              (2) 
Finally, we use the log-rank test to examine the difference in survival curves between firms with 
high ESG intensity and those with low. We use semi parametric approach to fit via maximum 
likelihood proportional hazards on a panel with multiple records using Cox proportional hazards 
model (Cox, 1972) for panel which extends our analysis taking into account the simultaneously 
impact of several risk factors on survival time. One of the advantages of Cox pro- portional hazards 
model is that works with no pre-specified baseline hazard function so it can take any functional 
form (Allison, 2000). We estimate the following model using Cox proportional hazard model on 
panel data ℎExit(𝑡, 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖) = ℎ0(𝑡) exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖+ 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖)                       (3) 
We define h(t) as the baseline hazard function with t to be time to exit from the market (failure). 
The dependent variable captures the risk of exiting the market. The independent variables hazard 
ratio measures the increase in failure risk for a unit increase. For continuous variables the hazard 
rate for one-unit increase is 100*(hazard ratio – 1) (Allison, 2000). Our variable of interest is firms’ 
sustainability performance (ESG). Following, the literature (Hensler et al., 1997); Wagner, 2010). 
we control for firms’ characteristics such as Sales, Sales Growth, Advertising, Firm Age, Patents, 
trademarks Return on Equity and firm financial crisis. All regressions include year and industry 
fixed effects. 
Finaly, we make an assumption that our data follow Weibull distribution and fit a parametric 
survival model with panel data. We cluster panel surviving data (Gutierrez et al., 2001) and fit a 
mix effect2 survival model containing both fixed and random effects. With the implementation of 
random effects, we take into account protentional bias that could arise from intracluster correlation. 
The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A.  
 
4.2. Empirical Results  
4.2.1. Analysis of the Hazard and Survival Curves (non-parametric approach) 
We provide graphic representation of hazard and survival functions for firms with ESG issues and 
those do not. Figures 1 and 2 provide Kaplan Meier survival and Nelson Aalen cumulative hazard 
estimates. Hazards functions for firms with no ESG Issues (Figure 1) are below those of firms with 
ESG issues and the gap widens in the length of time. Contrariwise, as we can see from Figure 2, 
the survival function of firms with ESG issues is bellow that of firms with no ESG issues. 
Graphical analysis indicates that the probability of delisting in greater for firms with ESG issues 
through the entire time span of our study. In addition, the long run test shows the survival 
distributions of the two samples are different at the 1% significant and provide evidence that there 
is efficiency in the comparison. In a nutshell, hazard and survival functions document that firms 
with ESG issues are more likely to exit the market compared with those with no ESG issues. The 
results suggest that sustainability is a risk mitigation tool and sustainable companies tend to be less 
risky with better survival profiles. 
 
2 Mixed-effects survival models contain both fixed effects and random effects. In longitudinal dataand panel data, random effects 
are useful for modeling intracluster correlation; that is, observationsin the same cluster are correlated because they share common 
cluster-level random effects. 
 
                
Figs. 1 Survival Estimates firms with and without ESG issues.                          Figs. 2 Survival function firms with and without ESG issues. 
 
4.2.2. Estimation using semi-parametric and parametric approach 
In order to test our hypothesis, we use two model specifications. Table 2 documents the results  
Cox proportional hazards model, specification 1,  which uses a semi parametric approach (columns 
1,3). In order to secure further robustness for results, specification 2, we report estimates of a 
mixed-effects parametric survival-time model with the assumption that the conditional distribution 
of the response is Weibull (columns 2,4). In both specifications the results are consistent and in 
line with our previous findings of the non-parametric analysis. In columns 1 and 2 we consider 
that a firm is failing when exiting the market while in 3 and 4 we expand our analysis taking into 
account firms that have an exit from the market for negative reasons. We control for the presence 
of no linear effects by using the quadratic term of sales (lnSales2) and is expected to find a negative 
association with firms’ probability exiting the market. We control for Growth in sales (Sales 
growth) (Hirsch, 1990) and innovation activity proxy by patents and trademarks. We find a 
negative association between patents and market delisting which is expected as firms through 
patent investing put barriers to the market, reduce risks and acquire competitive advantage. Last 
but not least, we control for firms’ advertising expenses to capture adjustments on consumers 
preferences and hence public support to companies. The results indicate that for both specifications 
we use to define the exit from the market and both semi- parametric and parametric models’ firms 
with ESG issues face higher probability of delisting from 8% to 17,8% compared with those no 
ESG issues. Our estimates, provide evidence to support our hypothesis that ESG issues weakness 
companies, increase uncertain and decrease their competitiveness. In a nutshell, through ESG, 
firms formulate strategies about non-financial factors (such as environmental, social and 
governance) however with great impact on financial, that will enable them to survive for longer 
periods of time in the market. 
Table 2: Semi- parametric and parametric estimates of firms’ ESG impact on the 
probability exiting the market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
 All firms Exiting the market Exits with for negative 
reasons 
ESG Issues 0.080* 0.077* 0.178** 0.178** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.070) (0.070) 
Log (Sales) 0.090** 0.086** -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) 
(Log (Sales))2 -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log (Sales growth) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (FirmAge) -0.205*** -0.195*** -0.193*** -0.192*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) (0.038) 
Log (Patents+1) -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.113*** -0.112*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.030) (0.030) 
Log (TM+1) -0.026 -0.029 -0.166*** -0.169*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.062) (0.062) 
Log (Advertising) -0.002 -0.002 0.017 0.017 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) 
Crisis  0.988*** 0.958*** 0.960*** 
  (0.152) (0.276) (0.275) 
Return on Equity -0.035*** -0.033** -0.055*** -0.056*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Observations 11,337 11,337 11,337 11,337 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
This table provides the estimations of Cox proportional hazards and mix- effect survival model of probability of failure 
and time-to failure. In all regressions we include industry and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. The standard errors are shown in parentheses below of the estimated coefficient. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. One two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5. Robustness Checks  
In this section, we use semi - parametric and parametric approaches to estimate the impact of three 
major (ESG) issues components namely environmental (EP) issues, social (SP) issues and 
governance (GP) issues on the probability exiting the market. As Table 3 shows, columns (1), (3), 
(5) and (7) and columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) present semi- parametric and parametric estimates 
respectively. Concerning delisting scenarios, we define as failed all firms exiting the market for 
negative reasons. In this way we categorize firms due to their inability to control risk and unveil 
their weaknesses to comply with the prerequisite market criteria. Following the literature, we 
control for sales (lnSales) and we capture the presence of no linear effects by using the quadratic 
term of sales (lnSales2) which is expected to find a negative association with firms’ probability 
exiting the market. In addition, we control for Growth in sales (Sales growth) (Hirsch, 1990) and 
innovation activity proxy by patents and trademarks. We find a negative association between 
innovation expressed by patents and trademarks and market delisting which is expected as firms 
through innovation put barriers to the market, reduce risks and acquire competitive advantage. Last 
but not least, we control for firms’ advertising expenses to capture adjustments on consumers 
preferences and hence public support to companies. Our results indicate that firms’ ESG exposure 
to reputational risks increase significant the probability of delisting and reduce the period of time 
that firms remain listed. Our finding is extended for issues on the mainly components of ESG such 
as social (SP) and governance (GP) but not in environmental. Concerning this outcome, our 
analysis shows that firms with social and governance issues face larger extent of information 
asymmetry around control transparency and social reputation so they are more likely to face exit 
mechanism. 
 
 
Table 3: Semi- parametric and parametric estimates of three major sustainability (ESG) 
components namely environmental (EP), social (SP) and governance (GP) impact on the 
probability exiting the market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ESG 
Issues 
ESG 
Issues 
EP 
Issues 
EP 
Issues 
GP 
Issues 
GP 
Issues 
SP 
Issues 
SP 
Issues 
         
ESG Issues 0.178** 0.178**       
 (0.070) (0.070)       
Environmental Issues   0.136 0.137     
   (0.087) (0.087)     
Governance Issues     0.258*** 0.255***   
     (0.081) (0.081)   
Social Issues       0.165** 0.166** 
         
Log (Sales) -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
(Log (Sales))2 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log (Sales growth) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (FirmAge) -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.192*** -0.191*** -0.194*** -0.193*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
Log (Patents+1) -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.111*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
Log (TM+1) -0.166*** -0.169*** -0.163*** -0.166*** -0.162*** -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.168*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Log (Advertising) 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Crisis 0.958*** 0.960*** 0.869*** 0.871*** 0.940*** 0.941*** 0.913*** 0.915*** 
 (0.276) (0.275) (0.273) (0.273) (0.274) (0.273) (0.275) (0.274) 
Return on Equity -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
         
Observations 11,337 11,337 11,337 11,337 11,337 11,337 11,337 11,337 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
This table provides the estimations of Cox proportional hazards and mix- effect survival model of probability of failure 
and time-to failure for the three major sustainability (ESG) components namely environmental (EP), social (SP) and 
governance (GP). In all regressions we include industry and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. The standard errors are shown in parentheses below of the estimated coefficient. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. One two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
5.1. Controlling for Service - Manufacturing Industries and crisis periods 
Service and manufacturing industries may contain firms with different characteristics such as 
growth, innovation and risk exposure. In this subsection, we study the impact of ESG issues on 
firms’ probability of exiting the market with respect on these industries. We also include in our 
study the three major components of ESG issues namely environmental (EP) issues, social (SP) 
issues and governance (GP) issues. Our analysis considers failed firms, all those exiting the market 
but excluding firms that have a successful exit from the market through a merger and acquisition 
(M&A). We define as successful exit, the one at which the share price of the company increases 
after the merger and acquisition announcement. We perform a semi parametric approach by using 
Cox proportional hazards model. We control for the presence of no linear effects by using the 
quadratic term of sales (lnSales2) and is expected to find a negative association with firms’ 
probability exiting the market. We control for Growth in sales (Sales growth) (Hirsch, 1990) and 
innovation activity proxy by patents and trademarks. We find a negative association between 
patents, trademarks and market delisting (Table 4). This is expected as firms’ patent and trademark 
investing put barriers to the market increases market establishment and consumer loyalty, reduce 
risks and acquire competitive advantage. We control for firms’ advertising expenses to capture 
adjustments on consumers preferences and hence public support to companies. By using semi- 
parametric estimates, we extend our initial findings to industry level. We find that firms in 
manufacturing sector are vulnerable to ESG reputation risks while those belonging to services are 
not. When we focus on ESG components the results are inline finding higher probability of 
delisting from 20% to 38,6% in manufacturing sector for governance and social ESG reputation 
exposure. This is consistent with the view that firms in the product market when are in a weaker 
position face greater risk of delisting (Chemmanur et al., 2019). Overall, our initial results are 
robust and we support the hypothesis that ESG issues play important role in firm delisting 
mechanism. 
 
Table 4: Semi- parametric estimates of ESG impact on firm exiting the market Controlling for Service - 
Manufacturing Industries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES _t _t _t _t _t _t _t _t _t _t _t _t 
 Total 
Sectors 
service Manufacturing Total 
Sectors 
service Manufacturing Total 
Sectors 
service Manufacturing Total 
Sectors 
service Manufactu
ring 
 ESG 
Issues 
ESG 
Issues 
ESG Issues EP Issues EP Issues EP Issues GP Issues GP Issues GP Issues SP Issues SP Issues SP Issues 
ESG Issues 0.178** 0.124 0.200**          
 (0.070) (0.108) (0.092)          
Environmental 
Issues 
   0.136 0.112 0.137       
    (0.087) (0.153) (0.106)       
Governance 
Issues 
      0.258*** 0.039 0.386***    
       (0.081) (0.127) (0.106)    
Social Issues          0.165** -0.088 0.274*** 
          (0.078) (0.132) (0.100) 
Log (Sales) -0.004 -0.059 0.005 -0.005 -0.056 0.003 -0.001 -0.063 0.012 -0.004 -0.072 0.009 
 (0.039) (0.091) (0.046) (0.039) (0.091) (0.045) (0.040) (0.090) (0.046) (0.040) (0.091) (0.046) 
(Log (Sales))2 -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.017** -0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
Log (Sales 
growth) 
0.006*** 0.078*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.078*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.078*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.078*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) 
Log (FirmAge) -0.193*** -0.149** -0.213*** -0.194*** -0.150** -0.215*** -0.192*** -0.148** -0.212*** -0.194*** -0.147** -0.214*** 
 (0.038) (0.066) (0.048) (0.038) (0.066) (0.048) (0.039) (0.066) (0.049) (0.038) (0.066) (0.048) 
Log 
(Patents+1) 
-0.113*** -0.137** -0.119*** -0.113*** -0.138** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.136** -0.126*** -0.113*** -0.134** -0.118*** 
 (0.030) (0.066) (0.034) (0.030) (0.066) (0.034) (0.029) (0.067) (0.034) (0.029) (0.067) (0.034) 
Log (TM+1) -0.166*** -0.277*** -0.062 -0.163*** -0.274*** -0.061 -0.162*** -0.274*** -0.057 -0.165*** -0.274*** -0.065 
 (0.062) (0.102) (0.081) (0.062) (0.102) (0.080) (0.062) (0.102) (0.081) (0.062) (0.102) (0.081) 
Log 
(Advertising) 
0.017 0.043* -0.006 0.019 0.044* -0.004 0.015 0.045* -0.012 0.018 0.047* -0.005 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.028) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.028) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027) 
Crisis 0.958*** 0.679* 1.211*** 0.869*** 0.613* 1.117*** 0.940*** 0.617* 1.229*** 0.913*** 0.567 1.178*** 
 (0.276) (0.364) (0.422) (0.273) (0.358) (0.420) (0.274) (0.360) (0.417) (0.275) (0.361) (0.421) 
Return on 
Equity 
-0.055*** -0.033*** -0.111*** -0.055*** -0.032*** -0.113*** -0.055*** -0.032*** -0.110*** -0.055*** -0.032*** -0.109*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) 
Observations 11,337 4,526 6,811 11,337 4,526 6,811 11,337 4,526 6,811 11,337 4,526 6,811 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
In table 5, we document the results of Cox proportional model (specification 1) for Crisis periods. 
We split our sample in subsamples for crisis and no crisis periods. Considering the basic analysis 
results we report that having sustainability ESG issues increase the probability of delisting and 
reduce the surviving time in both cold and hot market periods. The results suggest that during crisis 
periods the impact of ESG issues on firms’ probability of delisting is almost double. This implies 
that in crisis periods firms should pay even more attention to their ESG policies. Overall, our 
results support our main analysis and extent the importance of our findings by incorporate the extra 
systemic risk of crisis periods. 
   
 
    Table 5: Estimates of ESG impact on firm exiting the market Controlling for crisis periods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES _t _t _t 
    
ESG Issues 0.253*** 0.436* 0.241*** 
 (0.066) (0.262) (0.068) 
Log (Sales) -0.033 0.001 -0.026 
 (0.038) (0.099) (0.041) 
(Log (Sales))2 -0.019*** -0.021** -0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) 
Log (Sales growth) 0.006*** -0.042 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.036) (0.001) 
Log (FirmAge) -0.218*** -0.120 -0.237*** 
 (0.038) (0.107) (0.041) 
Log (Patents) -0.210*** -0.178** -0.218*** 
 (0.029) (0.074) (0.031) 
Log (TM) -0.211*** -0.356** -0.187*** 
 (0.062) (0.172) (0.066) 
Log (Advertising) -0.021 -0.013 -0.022 
 (0.018) (0.048) (0.020) 
Crisis 1.139***  1.106*** 
 (0.278)  (0.277) 
Return on Equity -0.064*** -0.040*** -0.097*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.014) 
Observations 11,337 1,252 10,085 
Crisis Overall Sample Sub-sample crisis 
periods  
 
Sub-sample not in 
crisis periods 
 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5.2. Other robustness checks  
For further robustness purposes, we examine the relation between ESG issues and firms’ 
exiting due negative acquisitions. We categorize as negative those with decreased share price after 
the acquisition announcement. Our results document that ESG issues weaken firms’ market 
position and increase the probability to be acquired while firms without ESG issues incorporate 
lower risk and are more likely to remain listed and for longer periods of time. Our findings indicate 
that firms with ESG exposure who are very close to fail considering the situation choose 
acquisitions in order to avoid their fate. This result is stronger when we focus to corporate 
governance issues.  
6. Conclusion   
In this paper, we use a dataset of US listed firms and perform a dynamic empiric analysis where 
ESG performance is associated with public firms’ market exiting profile. We consider different 
types of firms’ failure including exiting in the case of M&A and based on financial criteria apply 
a financial analysis to distinguish firms with successful exits from those who do not meet the 
requirements to remain in the markets. We apply nonparametric, semiparametric and parametric 
approaches of survival analysis in order to study the association between corporate sustainability 
and firms’ market survival. We also consider the impact on exiting mechanism of the three major 
sustainability (ESG) components namely environmental (EP), social (SP) and governance (GP) 
and study this relation in Service and Manufacturing Industries. Last but not least, we also examine 
if our findings remain unaltered during crisis periods. 
The findings indicate that firms with ESG issues face higher probability of exiting the 
market across all determinants of delisting. The results remain unaltered even when we consider 
subsamples with respect to Service and Manufacturing Industries and crisis periods. 
In addition, our research provides evidence to support that firms with ESG issues have 
higher probability to be acquired compared with those without ESG issues, especially when we 
focus to corporate governance issues.  
Overall, the empirical results of this research show how listed firms may be able to 
incorporate the benefits arising from ESG sustainable policies considering firms’ delisting 
mechanism and suggest how such incorporations may contribute to the reduction of the number of 
firms exiting US market. Particularly, it contributes to the literature by bring to light firms’ 
corporate sustainability performance as a no financial characteristic that leads to substantial 
benefits for firms market survival. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table Α.1. Variable names and definitions. 
Variables Definition 
ESG Variables  
RRI Rep Risk RRI index that quantifies a company's exposure to environmental, 
social and governance matters  
EP issues An index that quantifies a company's exposure to environmental matters  
SP issues  An index that quantifies a company's exposure to social matters  
GP issues An index that quantifies a company's exposure to governance matters  
ESG issues  Dummy variable set to 1 if there is firms exposure to environmental, social and 
governance matters  
Control Variables: 
 
 
Log (Sales) Natural log of firms’ sales  
(Log (Sales))2 Natural log of sales quadratic term that indicates  
Log (Sales growth) Log of firm’s sales growth 
Log (Firm Age) Log of the number of years from the firm’s initial incorporation date. 
Log (Advertising) The natural log of Firms advertising expenses 
Log (ΤΜ) The natural log of firm’s trademarks  
Log (Patents) The natural log of firm’s patents  
Return on Equity Firms return on equity 
Crisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for financial crisis period, else 0. 
 
 
Table A1: Estimates of firms M&A probability with respect to ESG issues and its three major components 
namely environmental (EP) issues, social (SP)issues and governance (GP) issues on firms M&A probability. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Successful merger Successful merger Successful merger Successful merger 
     
ESG issues 0.013***    
 (0.003)    
Governance (GP) 
issues 
 0.294***   
  (0.061)   
Environmental 
(EP) issues 
  0.051  
   (0.062)  
Social (SP) issues    0.031 
    (0.059) 
Log (Sales) 0.280*** 0.252*** 0.216** 0.213** 
 (0.100) (0.089) (0.085) (0.084) 
(Log (Sales))2 -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log (Sales growth) -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Log (FirmAge) 0.029 0.039 0.037 0.039 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
Log (Patents) -0.019 -0.021 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Log (TM) -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.122*** -0.123*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Log (Advertising) -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Crisis 0.870*** 0.879*** 0.753*** 0.759*** 
 (0.223) (0.223) (0.224) (0.224) 
Return on Equity -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
     
Observations 11,337 11,337 11,337 11,337 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
 
 
